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Abstract 
The quality of services provided by institutional investors has attracted considerable attention. This 
paper adds to the debate by showing that institutional differences in setting up define contribution 
personal schemes have an economically and statistically significant impact on the returns. Using a 
sample of 10,326 UK defined contribution personal pension funds over July 1990 – June 2019, I show 
that pension funds that have a third party involved in contract setting and subsequent oversight deliver 
0.96–1.67% higher gross returns and charge 0.7% lower fees than pension funds offered directly to the 
public without any third, well–informed party involved.  I also show that the introduction of additional 
governance bodies in 2015 resulted in widening the performance gap which further supports the notion 
that investment governance has a material impact on fund performance. The results highlight the 
importance of investment oversight and call for more protection for individual investors. 
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1. Introduction  
The pension assets of the OECD counties, accumulated through pension funds, pension 
insurance contracts and other pension servicing vehicles, amounted to $42.5 trillion at the end of 2018. 
Given that more than half of this money is in defined contribution (DC) schemes and that DC schemes 
are growing at almost twice the rate of defined benefit (DB) schemes (8.9% per annum compared to 
4.6%)2, it is inevitable that DC schemes will become the dominant form of pension provision in the 
coming years. Since DC pensions will be the main source of old age provision for millions of people 
around the world, the question of the quality of DC pension services becomes a crucial concern. 
Furthermore, ensuring the appropriate quality of DC services is additionally important because typically 
DC contributors have low levels of financial literacy, and poor monitoring skills and abilities.    
In this paper, using a sample of 10,326 UK DC personal pension funds over July 1990 – June 
2019, I assess whether funds offered to investors in group personal pension (GPP) schemes perform 
better than funds offered to investors in individual personal pension (IPP) schemes.3 The GPP and the 
IPP agreements are both between individual contributors and providers, and offer seemingly similar 
services, but GPPs are only available to employees of the company who set the agreement with a 
particular provider, while IPPs are available to the general public, and as such the individuals are free 
to choose from any provider offering IPP schemes.4 When a company is dissatisfied with the level of 
services provided and decides to change the pension provider, this can carry considerable reputational 
and financial loss to the provider, which may put extra pressure on the providers to deliver good returns. 
In contrast, IPP investors, like any other body of small and dispersed investors, have low bargaining 
and monitoring abilities and face high charges if they wish to swap pension providers. Thus, although 
there are no reasons to believe that the individuals saving under GPP schemes are any more financially 
savvy, better at monitoring, etc. than the IPP investors, the involvement of employers in contract setting 
 
2 According to Willis Towers Watson (2019), in the period 2008 – 2018 the annual growth rate of DC schemes in 
7 major world economies (i.e. the U.S., the UK, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Japan, Canada and Australia) was 
8.9% as compared to 4.6% for the DB schemes. 
3 In the UK, there are two types of supplementary (in addition to the state) pension schemes: occupational and 
personal. Occupational pensions are set up by employers and the contracts are between the employer and the 
provider. Personal pensions are individual contracts with pension providers. The UK personal pensions amount 
to £3 trillion assets under management and 27.4 million contributors in 2017 – 2018 (OECD, 2018). 





and subsequent monitoring creates a positive externality that may be beneficial to the GPP investors in 
the sense that GPPs outperform IPPs. I find strong evidence that this is the case.  
Specifically, I study three types of funds: (i) funds specializing in UK equity, (ii) funds 
specializing in global equity and (iii) funds specializing in mixed investments of equity and fixed 
income securities that enable a high proportion of assets under management to be invested in equity. 
These investment styles cover nearly 40% of funds available on the market. The comparison of the 
performance alphas estimated for a range of risk factor models (CAPM, Fama–French Three Factor 
Model with Momentum and Fama–French Five Factor Model) for gross monthly returns shows that 
there is consistent evidence that GPPs outperform IPPs by more than 1 percent per annum, and that 
these differences in the performance cannot be attributed to provider selection bias, i.e. unobserved, 
provider specific characteristics that are correlated with the services they offer. Assessing the 
benchmark relative performance and the performance of funds with the same benchmarks (using a 
manually constructed, unique data set), I also show that the performance differences cannot be 
explained by differences in investment focus of funds. Moreover, I show that the difference in the 
performance between GPPs and IPPs increased following the governance reform of 2015 that was 
designed to improve governance and monitoring oversight of GPPs but not of IPPs. The change in the 
performance was bigger for smaller providers and funds, which is consistent with the notion that smaller 
employers were poorer monitors (OFT 2013).  In addition, I also document that the IPP investors pay 
statistically significantly higher fees than the GPP investors.  Thus, the observed differences in the 
performance are further magnified by the differences in the fees paid. 
According to my knowledge, this is the first study that analyzes and documents differences in 
performance between two groups of seemingly similar pension schemes, but which differ by having, or 
not having, a third party involved in setting them up and monitoring. I show that the differences are 
statistically significant and economically material. This is also the first study that provides an 
assessment of the regulatory changes that were designed to improve governance and monitoring of 
GPPs. The study confirms the ‘common knowledge’ widely reported by the UK regulators and press 





investors, and most importantly, it is shown, for the first time, that the difference in the performance 
exceeds the difference in fees. 
Given both the current size and growth of DC pensions around the world, any discriminatory 
practices within the DC pension industry could impact significantly on the retirement income of 
millions of investors.  Pension savings, even if not compulsory, are strongly encouraged (by 
governments and international agencies), are long–term in nature, and have long–term financial and 
social implications. In addition, they are even more important for low–income investors, which typically 
also means less financially savvy, than they are for high income, more financially savvy ones. 
Identifying whether DC pension funds discriminate between investors by providing different 
investment opportunities to similar investors according to whether, or not, an ‘informed’ third party is 
involved in setting up and subsequent monitoring of pension funds is of vital importance.   
The paper adds to several strands of the literature. First, the literature on the role of employers 
in supporting pension schemes. While many papers are critical about the quality of pension services 
and investments offered through employer supported schemes (e.g. Elton et al. 2006, Rauh 2006, 
Benartzi et al. 2007, Farrell and Shoag 2016), this paper implies that employers’ involvement, even if 
it is only in the form of a ‘third party’ is better than its absence. It also adds to the literature on the 
importance of financial advice for not–so–financially savvy individuals (e.g. Allen and Gale 1999, 
Bhattacharya et al. 2012; Inderst and Ottaviani 2012, von Gaudecker 2015, Guiso and Viviano 2015, 
Foerster et al. 2017, Bianchi 2018, Dahlquist et al. 2018) by documenting better performance of funds 
selected by employers (i.e. a third, well–informed party) than those available to the public. It adds to 
the literature on fund performance by exposing wealth managers’ weak performance when monitoring 
pressure is low (e.g. Almazan et al. 2004, James and Karceski 2006, Adams et al. 2018). It also 
contributes to the regulatory literature on the effectiveness of different saving schemes (e.g. Poterba et 
al. 1995, Choi et al. 2002, Lindbeck and Persson 2003, Carroll et al. 2009, Looney and Hardin 2009, 
Beshears et al. 2015, Ahmed et al. 2018, Boes and Siegman 2018), and to the literature on the 
importance of trust for market participation (El–Alttar and Poschke 2011, Ballock et al. 2015). Finally, 
it contributes to the literature that documents the importance of relational contracts for the provision of 





discriminatory practices of financial intermediaries (e.g. Cavalluzzo et al. 2002, Houge and Wellman 
2007, Gil–Bazo and Ruiz–Verdú 2009, Beck and Brown 2015, Palia 2016, Pool et al. 2016, Agarwal et 
al. 2017, Egan et al. 2019, Karolyi 2018).  
The paper has far–reaching policy implications as its results indicate that empowering 
individual investors may not be enough to increase the efficiency of financial intermediaries. Individual 
investors may need much more protection from regulatory bodies than they currently have, to ensure 
that they receive good returns on their savings. It also adds to the ongoing debate on the role and 
importance of boards of trustees/fiduciaries in monitoring pension schemes’ performance (OFT 2013, 
FCA, 2017, CMA 2018), and signals that the debate on the poor quality of the UK pension system might 
be ill–focused. The popular press and pension activists discuss at length the high fees charged by IPPs.  
This research shows that while the fees are indeed high, the performance of IPPs is much worse that the 
performance of GPP funds, and the losses created by this underperformance are larger than the 
differences in fees between the two types of schemes. Although, the paper is concerned with the UK 
DC pension schemes, it provides valuable insight for all countries with DC pension provision.   
 
2. Institutional background and hypotheses 
2.1 Schemes and reform milestones 
The UK 1986 Social Security Act established personal pensions (GPP and IPP) as the primary 
form of non–occupational DC pension provision by insurance companies, friendly societies, and banks. 
Currently, the majority of personal schemes are provided by large insurance companies (e.g. Aegon, 
Aviva, Friends Life, Legal and General, Prudential, Scottish Life, Scottish Widows, Standard Life, and 
Zurich, etc.), and a number of non–insurance companies, such as BlackRock, Fidelity, and HSBC.  
IPPs are offered directly to individual members of the public and, at the time of signing an 
agreement the individual is usually free to choose from all the IPP funds offered by IPP providers. In 
contrast, under GPP schemes employers facilitate an agreement with one or more financial institutions 
to provide personal pensions to their employees. As such, GPP schemes are organized by employers 





and the individual employee who signs the contract. Typically, GPP members can only choose from an 
agreed range of funds and may be offered default options if they do not wish to display preferences.  
When a company wishes to offer a GPP scheme to employees, they typically approach a 
consultant (known as an Employee Benefit Consultant) who checks with a range of providers who 
would be willing to offer their services.5 When the scheme is created, it is common for an employer to 
establish a governance group, also known as fiduciary group. A governance group is expected to 
conduct periodic reviews of the performance of the scheme, and then consider amendments (e.g. 
changes to the pool of funds on offer) or even seek a new pension provider.  
Even though many employers have created governance groups, the oversight of GPP schemes 
has not been as diligent as the governments and regulators wished.6 To improve the quality of 
governance investment practices of workplace pensions (of which GPPs are part) an Investment 
Governance Group (IGG), as part of the Treasury, was created in 2008. The IGG recommended that 
employers should improve their oversight of DC pension arrangements and clearly allocate investment 
governance responsibilities, but the policy failed to bring about any material changes.7  To improve 
GPP schemes’ transparency and market competition, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA 2015) 
introduced the requirement that all providers who offer GPPs had to have their own Independent 
Governance Committees (IGCs) whose role is to scrutinize the value for money of the provider’s GPP 
schemes.8 Independence is meant to be a key feature of IGCs. An IGC must contain at least five 
directors, at least half of whom must be independent, including an independent chair. However, given 
that IGC directors are chosen and paid by providers, numerous voices have been raised regarding the 
true independence of IGC directors.9 Further problems with market competition, fiduciary management, 
 
5 In some cases, the advice will be provided by banks, accountancy firms and legal advisers (OFT, 2013). 
6 Towers Watson (2012) reports that 86% of employers with GPPs had a governance group, and these groups had 
a good mix of skills (69% of the governance groups had a pension department representative, 44% had a finance 
specialist and 53% had a scheme member representative). Yet, it concluded that fiduciaries of GPP schemes 
assume that “any risks should be borne/mitigated solely by the members and the pension provider”. 
7 The IGG’s (2010) report states that “many respondents (or their representative associations) insisted that this 
duty on employers [increased engagement in DC schemes’ governance] was not practical and could lead to many 
employers transferring members into the government-sponsored National Employment Savings Trust (NEST)”. 
NEST was a new government supported pension scheme that was under creation and started to operate in 2013. 
8 In the case of smaller and less complex schemes a Governance Advisory Arrangement (GAA) with a third 
party can be created instead of an IGC. A GAA may be a cheaper solution but has the same duties and 
responsibilities of monitoring and challenging providers. 





insufficient governance and engagement were also documented in reports of FCA (FCA 2016, 2017) 
and of the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA 2018). According to Wills Towers Watson’s 
(2018) only 25% of the surveyed investors were positive about the governance oversight provided by 
IGCs. A review of the effectiveness of IGCs was scheduled for 2019–2020 but is yet to happen. 
While numerous authorities have been concerned with the quality of the services provided by 
GPPs and their investment governance, significantly less attention has been focused on IPPs. The 
Financial Services Authority’s report of 2008 (FSA 2008) is one of a very few publicly available reports 
assessing IPP schemes and this presents a rather gloomy picture.10 It states that in 40% of the 
investigated cases “the fund(s) recommended were not suitable to the customer’s attitude to risk and 
personal circumstances”, and that there were cases of investors receiving misleading information. The 
report mentions cases “where providers used the standard 5%, 7% and 9% rates of return to project for 
cash funds.”11 Despite these shortcomings, no regulatory changes, or even recommendations, have 
taken place. Thus, while the regulators keep addressing investment governance standards of GPPs, IPP 
savers can only rely on their own wits and expertise.  
 
2.2 Switches, transfers and fees  
There are no reports that explicitly compare the conditions of switching providers, transferring 
money within providers, or exit and management fees for GPPs and IPPs. However, what evidence 
exists, it points in the direction of GPP investors being in a more privileged position than IPP ones. 
Even though, GPP investors are restricted to investing with the providers chosen by their employer, 
when the employer decides to switch providers this does not bear any additional costs to employees. In 
contrast, switching a provider is expensive for IPP investors. FSA’s (2008) report on IPP funds states 
that in 79% of investigated cases “the switch involved extra product costs without good reason.”   
 
10 The report jointly discusses IPP schemes and self–invested personal pensions. 
11 The annualized average monthly T–bill rate in 2006 was 4.7% (varied between 4.4% and 5.1%), in 2007 it was 





The Pension Commission (2004) reports that at least 75% of the explicit cost of providing an 
IPP pension was a fixed cost incurred upfront in the selling process.12 Thus, it is common for IPP 
investors to stop contributing rather than moving money around. Smith (2004) documents that one in 
eight people stopped contributing after one year. According to The Telegraph “policies established in 
the Eighties and Nineties frequently contained small print that meant up to 40pc of their value could be 
swallowed in penalties if they were cashed in or transferred before a specified age, normally 55 or 60”.13 
There also is a dearth of information about management fees and charges. OFT (2013) reports 
a lack of transparency regarding fees paid by employees and even though, since 2001, numerous fees 
started to be bundled under one figure known as annual management charges (AMCs), there was no 
consistency across the industry in what AMCs consisted of. The comparison of the fees charged by 
pension schemes is practically impossible before 2012, as it was only in July 2012 that the unified 
reporting standards were introduced following the adoption of the EU regulation known as the Key 
Investor Information Document (KIID). 
The Department for Work and Pensions (DWP 2014) reports that the average AMC of GPP 
schemes was 0.84%, with small schemes’ members (12 to 99 employees) paying on average 0.91% and 
big schemes’ members (over 1,000 employees) paying 0.51%.14 There are no official statistics reporting 
fees charged to individual investors of IPP schemes, but if they are treated as one–person companies, a 
simple extrapolation of GPP fees would suggest that individuals saving with IPPs were likely to pay 
well over 1% of AMCs. Individual cases of abnormally high fees paid by IPP investors are often 
discussed in the press.15 In Section 6, I provide data and discuss fee comparisons between IPPs and 
GPPs for 2018. 
 
12 For years providers faced no regulatory restrictions on charges or penalties they could impose and had full 
flexibility in determining the level of minimum contribution. In April 2017, the FCA introduced a cap on early 
exit pension charges for some workplace pensions (including GPPs). 
13 The Guardian quotes the Pensions Regulator’s report (currently not publicly available)  stating that some small 
provider’s exit charge was 24% (https://www.theguardian.com/money/2016/nov/15/pension-exit-fees-capped-
over-55s);  Financial Times reports  that  exit fees can reach 30% but typically range between 2-5% 
https://www.ft.com/content/8be25560-f46d-11e6-8758-6876151821a6; The Telegraph reports than on average 
exit penalties for individuals below 55 years of age are 10%.  
14 These fees are much higher than those reported by Pitt-Watson and Mann (2012) for the Dutch pensions 
where the average fee of the collective pensions was 0.15%, and of the individual contract schemes was 1.27%. 







3. Hypothesis statement 
The existing literature documents that investment performance is strongly related to financial skills 
(e.g. Lakonishok and Maberly 1990, Dorn and Huberman 2005, Barber and Odean 2008). Thus, the 
accepted view is that individuals, having poor financial skills (e.g. Bernheim 1995, 1998, Lusardi and 
Mitchell 2006, 2014, Agarwal and Mazumder 2013) are better off when they seek the advice and 
services of wealth managers rather than invest by themselves (Allen and Gale 1999, von Gaudecker 
2015, Gennaioli et al. 2015, Guiso and Viviano 2015). Therefore, it should not make any difference 
whether individuals invest with GPP schemes or with IPP schemes given that both types of schemes 
are offered and serviced by professional asset management companies.  Moreover, if financial literacy 
matters for investment success, IPPs might perform better than GPPs because the average IPP investor 
may be more financial aware and skilled than the average GPP investor. This is because, an investors’ 
decision to start saving for retirement is typically associated with higher personal wealth and requires 
an ability to engage in the choice of provider and scheme. In contrast, employees of a company are 
offered a GPP scheme, and the investment details are simplified through the restricted choice on offer.  
The above provides an argument suggesting that IPPs may perform somewhat better than GPPs. 
The counter argument, however, is that because GPPs have well–informed third parties involved in 
setting them up and subsequent oversight, whereas IPPs do not, GPPs should perform better than IPPs. 
I test this hypothesis.  
Following on from this hypothesis, if better performance of GGPs relative to IPPs is indeed the 
result of institutional differences, then it is important to eliminate other potential drivers of performance 
differences, i.e. it should be the case that performance differences persist when various fund and 
provider characteristics are controlled for.  
For example, if differences in performance between GPPs and IPPs are simply the result of 
economies of scale, then controlling for size would explain the differences in performance, so it needs 
to be shown this is not the case. In addition, if the differences in performance are related to unobserved 
provider specific factors, which may happen to be correlated with the services they offer, the 
performance differences could also be attributed to these factors. To ensure such selection bias is not 





persist once the sample is restricted to those funds whose providers offer both types of schemes (this is 
because the provider specific factors would be common for the provider’s services).16  
To further test whether the difference in the performance of GPPs and IPPs is related to the 
institutional setting, I test how the difference in the performance of GPPs and IPPs changed after the 
introduction of IGCs. The introduction of IGCs for GPPs should increase the performance gap between 
GPPs and IPPs even if the critics of IGCs are correct in questioning the extent of the IGCs’ 
independence.17  Moreover, the increase in the performance gap should be larger for smaller employers 
who are known to be less engaged in GPP oversight than larger employers (OFT, 2013). The identity 
of employers is not observable, but it is likely that employers’ size is positively correlated with the size 
of pension schemes, and that big employers use big, well–known pension providers to service their 
GPPs. Thus, the size of pension providers and/or of GPPs can act as a proxy for the quality of monitoring 
prior to the reform and negatively covary with the impact of the introduction of IGSs on the performance 
gap between GPPs and IPPs. 
Finally, there is the possibility that some unobservable relationship between funds and their 
benchmarks could be driving the results, e.g. different benchmarks could be a sign of different 
investment objectives which in turn impact on performance. To test that this is not the case, the 
difference in the performance between IPPs and GPPs should persist for funds with the same 
benchmarks.   
 
4. Data and methodology  
4.1.  Funds data 
Morningstar Direct lists 1,965 GPP funds that opened between January 1968 and June 2016, 
and 17,114 IPP funds that opened between January 1963 and June 2016. Of these funds 879 GPPs and 
9,447 were identified as primary asset class funds. For these funds their gross monthly returns, the date 
of inception, the name of provider, net assets, size of the funds as surveyed, investment style as specified 
 
16 Egan et al. (2019) show such a ‘specialization’ effect of financial advisors in providing different quality services. 
17 However, if the increase in the gap is not observed, it does not imply that better monitoring does not result in 





by the Association of British Investors’ Pension Classification (ABI PC) investment style (ABI, 2017) 
and as specified by the Global Broad Category Group (GBCG), the Primary Prospectus Benchmark 
(PPB), and a short description of the investment strategy were collected.18 Funds’ monthly returns were 
collected from July 1990 until June 2019 to give at least three years of the monthly performance data 
per fund. The choice of the starting date of the returns was dictated by the availability of the Fama–
French factors (see Section 4.2 for details). The funds’ size data were collected from January 2007, the 
first available date.  
An ABI PC classification was available for many funds. Where it was missing, the ‘soft’ 
information about ‘Investment Strategy–English’ provided by Morningstar Direct and GBCG 
classification were used to allocate funds to one of the 35 ABI PC investment styles. In this way, missing 
investment styles were assigned to 145 funds leaving 781 funds without the investment style 
classification. Given that many ABI investment styles would not contain enough funds to be suitable 
for analysis, ABI investment styles were grouped according to the funds’ asset classes and geographical 
investment focus. The groupings are referred to as investment styles. For instance, the UK equity 
investment style was created out of UK All Companies, UK Smaller Companies and UK Equity Income, 
the Mixed High equity was made up of two Mixed sub–investment styles that allow for a high 
proportion of equity in funds’ portfolios, etc. Details of the creation of the investment styles are 
provided in Appendix 1 (this and all the other Appendixes are available online). 
Table 1 shows that equity investments dominate among pension funds. ‘Pure’ equity funds 
account for 44.1% of GPPs and 44.6% of IPPs. If the Mixed High equity funds are added, the 
corresponding shares increase to 52.2% and 56.6% respectively. These proportions would be higher 
still, if equity investments of the Specialist funds were included, as these funds are likely to have high 
proportions of equity investments.  
Assessing the size of the individual investment styles creates some issues. First, the size of 
funds (both net assets and surveyed values) has many missing observations. In the last quarter of 2007, 
only 19 GPPs (or just 5.4% that existed at that time) and 654 (or 14.1%) of IPPs provided information 
 
18 There is no information about returns on funds that have stopped operating. Thus, they are excluded from the 





about their net assets. The corresponding statistics for the surveyed values were 18 (5.1%) and 2,834 
(61.2%). The numbers of funds that provided size data increased over time, yet even at the end of the 
sample, there were many missing observations. Net assets data were provided for less than half of the 
funds for which the surveyed size data were available. Therefore, in the rest of the paper, only the fund 
size data as surveyed are used and referred to as ‘Size’. 
Table 1 shows the numbers of funds of four major investment styles and their corresponding 
Size as of the first half of 2019.19 First, for each fund the average Size based on the values reported for 
the first half of 2019 was calculated. Then, the averages were summed across the investment styles. 
 
*************  insert Table 1 here  ************* 
 
A considerably higher proportion of IPPs than GPPs reported their Size. The relative ranking 
of the individual investment styles based on how many funds reported their Size is similar to the ranking 
based on all the funds, yet the ranking of the investment styles based on Size changes. For instance, the 
Mixed High equity investment style appears to take a much bigger proportion of the market when funds’ 
Size is accounted for than when the number of funds is counted.   
Given the data availability, the performance analysis focuses on the UK equity, Global equity, 
and Mixed High equity investment styles. These investment styles were chosen as they are relatively 
big whether the number of funds or Size are accounted for, because they have relatively large numbers 
of GPP funds, and because the financial literature provides a range of factors that are commonly 
accepted for a risk–adjusted performance analysis.  Moreover, these investment styles also have 
relatively, i.e. in comparison with the other investment styles, information about benchmarks. In total, 
64 GPP and 1,357 IPP UK equity funds, 88 GPP and 935 IPP Global equity funds, and 48 GPP and 
1,655 IPP Mixed High equity funds were used in the performance analysis. These corresponded to 
38.4% of GPPs and 46.3% of IPPs with at least three years of data. 
Morningstar Direct provides several performance statistics in relation to funds’ PPBs if these 
are common market indexes.20 To maintain as much of the sample as possible, great effort was made to 
 
19 Appendix 1 provides statistics for the more detailed specification of investment styles. 





identify individual PPBs and obtain their performance statistics. Morningstar Direct reports benchmarks 
as they are stated in primary prospectuses, i.e. there is no synchronization of their names or a common 
way of reporting compound indexes (i.e. indexes that are obtained as a weighted average of several 
indexes). The same benchmark can be recorded under a variety of abbreviations or components can be 
listed in a different order (e.g. one fund can report being benchmarked to FTSE Dv Ex UK TR GBP 
60.000% + FTSE AllSh TR GBP 40.000%, while another fund states that it is benchmark is FTSE ALL 
Share TR GBP 40.000% + FTSE Dv Ex UK TR GBP 60.000%). Thus, hundreds of benchmark names 
were individually checked for consistency. Returns of all the indexes if originally not quoted in pound 
sterling were converted to pound sterling (using the Morningstar Direct conversion to preserve 
consistency).  
Across the three investment styles of interest, 45 GPPs and 628 IPPs did not provide any 
information about their benchmarks and further 3 GPPs and 107 IPPs declared that they did not have a 
benchmark. In total, the UK equity GPP funds used four different benchmarks while the IPP 
counterparts used 47. Returns for all four UK GPP benchmarks were obtained. For the UK equity IPP 
funds returns on the 35 benchmarks were obtained. These corresponded to 1,249 IPP funds.  
The Global equity GPPs used 41 benchmarks and returns were obtained for 23 of them 
(covering 74 funds). The corresponding figures for IPPs were 117 and 92 (covering 788 funds).  The 
Mixed High equity GPPs used 27 benchmarks, of which returns were obtained for 14 (these covered 23 
funds). And the IPP counterparts used 135 benchmarks, of which 82 (covering 550 funds) were 
obtained.  The loss of benchmarks, and therefore funds, was caused by incomplete names of the 
benchmarks or of their components or incomplete information about the weights applied to individual 
components.  
 
4.2. Risk factors 
The regression methodology closely follows Ferreira et al. (2018).  First, for each fund a series 
of AlphaMOM based on the Fama–French Three Factor Model with the Momentum factor (Fama and 
French 1992, 1993, Carhart 1997) was estimated using three years of monthly returns. The European 





funds. As a robustness check, the alphas were also estimated using the CAPM and the Fama–French 
Five Factor Model (Fama and French 2015). These are referred to as AlphaCAPM and AlphaFF5F 
respectively. All the risk factors (Market, SMB, HML, RMW and CMA) were downloaded from 
Kenneth French’s website21 and converted to pound sterling using the Bank of England’s end of month 
exchange rate of pound sterling to the U.S. dollar. To calculate the market excess returns the U.S. risk–
free rate was added back to the market factors (Global and European) and the UK one–month T–bill 
rate was subtracted.  
Several specifications of the risk factors were adopted to calculate the alphas of the Mixed High 
equity funds. Given that the Mixed High equity funds contain a high proportion of equities (both 
domestic and overseas equities were allowed), I used all three specifications of equity factors, as 
described above for the Global equity funds. However, since a small fraction of the Mixed High equity 
portfolios was invested in fixed income securities, controlling for the equity risk only seemed 
inappropriate.  Fama and French (1993) argue that two types of risk need to be controlled for: term 
structure risk and default risk. They propose that changes in the term structure can be proxied by the 
difference between the returns on long–term government bonds and one–month T–bills measured at the 
end of the previous month. The change in default rates, being associated with the change in the 
economic conditions, can be proxied by the difference between the returns on the market portfolio of 
long–term corporate bonds and the long–term government bonds.  
Therefore, the risk–adjusted performance of the Mixed High equity funds was achieved by 
regressing their monthly returns on the same equity factors that were used in the analysis of the Global 
equity funds plus the term structure factor and default factor calculated for the UK fixed income 
securities and for the global fixed income securities following Fama and French (1993). More 
specifically, the UK term structure factor (UK TERM) was defined as the difference between the 
monthly returns on the Markit iBoxx GBP Gilts 15+ index and the one–month lagged one–month T–
bill. The UK default factor (UK DFLT) was the difference between Markit iBoxx GBP Corporate 15+ 
index and the Markit iBoxx GBP Gilts 15+ index. The Global term structure factor (GL TERM) was 
 





calculated in the same way as the UK term structure factor but using the Markit iBoxx Sovereigns 15+ 
index (a global index). Finally, the global default factor (GL DFLT) was defined as the difference 
between the Markit iBoxx Liquid Corp Long Dated index and the Markit iBoxx Sovereigns 15+ index. 
The indexes were obtained from Morningstar Direct. 
Thus, the alphas of the Mixed High equity funds were assessed using a five–factor model 
(CAPM + the four fix income risk factors), an eight–factor models (MOM equity model + the four fix 
income risk factors), and a nine–factor model (FF5F + the four fix income risk factors) over the period 
April 2004 – June 2019 because it was the period of availability for some of the bond indexes. To 
simplify the notation, alphas of the Mixed High equity funds have the subscripts which identify the 
equity risk factors to keep it consistent with the notation adopted for the other two investment styles 
(the fixed income risk factors are the same in all the specifications). 
The summary statistics of all the risk factors are provided in Appendix 2.  They show that the 
European (EU) and the global (GL) equity risk factors have similar characteristics, and that they are 
more volatile than the fixed income risk factors.  
 
4.3. Funds’ and providers’ characteristics 
In this paper, I am interested in studying differences in the performance between GPPs and 
IPPs. Thus, the dummy DGPP that separates GPPs from IPPs defined as one for funds offered under GPP 
agreements and zero otherwise (i.e. for the IPP agreements) is of the main interest. If GPPs outperform 
IPPs, the coefficients estimated for DGPP should be statistically significantly positive.  
To test the impact of the creation of IGCs on the relative difference in the performance between 
GPPs and IPPs, a dummy DIGC equal to one for observations after April 2015, and zero otherwise was 
created. DIGC is interacted with other variables to test the impact of the introduction of IGCs.  
It is well documented in the mutual fund literature that funds’ and providers’ characteristics 
covary with performance (e.g. Brown and Goetzmann 1994, Elton et al. 1996, Jayaraman et al. 2002, 
Wermers 2003, Kacperczyk et al. 2005, Barras et al. 2010, Pástor et al. 2015, Ferreira et al. 2018). Thus, 
at the fund level – age, type of management and size, and at the provider level – absolute and relative 





the month of a fund’s inception. As there is some evidence that external management in not neutral to 
fund performance (e.g. Chen et. al. 2013, Del Guercio and Reuter 2014, Chuprinin et. al. 2015), a 
dummy ‘Outsourced’ equal to one if asset management of a fund was outsourced to an external asset 
manager and zero if a fund was run internally was introduced.   Fund size is measured in two ways. 
First, referred to as Size, is the value of fund’s assets at the end of a calendar month expressed in millions 
of pound sterling. The second measure, referred to as Size_avr, is the average of the reported monthly 
Size for the period of the alphas’ calculations, i.e. across three–year windows used to estimate the 
alphas. Size_avr is introduced to better align the funds’ size with the period over which the alphas were 
calculated and to disregard the argument that the results are subject to reverse causality, i.e. performance 
affects size.22 
It is common to control for fund flows in the mutual fund literature. There is no data on pension 
fund flows, but this should not weaken the analysis. In contrast to mutual funds, UK pension fund 
investors do not have flexibility in withdrawing their money from one fund and transferring it to another. 
Hence, there are practically no outflows other than those related to retirement driven exits from the UK 
pension funds. Moreover, investors face restrictions on how much they can save tax free (e.g. since 
2006 there has been a limit imposed on the total amount of money over the life time of an individual 
that’s/he can save with pension tax benefits), the pension industry suffers from low transparency making 
it hard for individuals to identify best performing funds, and individual GPP funds are available to 
individuals only when they are employed by companies that have facilitated agreements with particular 
providers. Thus, it is rather unlikely that fund flows, even if observable, would be as performance 
related as they are documented to be for the U.S. mutual funds.   
As already discussed in Section 4.1, the fund size statistics start in January 2007 and are 
available for a fraction of funds only. The frequency of the data improves over time, but still less than 
a third of the funds report their size statistics at some point between January 2007 and June 2019. As 
this creates issues with accounting for fund size, it also makes accounting for the size of providers 
 
22 I have also used lagged values of Size, but it did not affect the results. However, it resulted in a considerable 
loss of observations. Using Size_avr, increases the sample size as it smooths through missing observations, 
although, as discussed is Section 5, it reduces the explanatory power of the regressions. The estimation results for 





unreliable. To deal with the issue, the size of the providers is proxied by the number of funds they 
operate (Prov_funds) and by the number of funds they operate in a given investment style (Prov_style). 
That is, Prov_style denotes the number of UK equity funds in the regressions for the UK equity funds, 
the number of Global equity funds in the regression based on the Global equity funds, and the number 
of Mixed High equity funds in the Mixed High equity regressions.  In addition, several ratios were 
calculated to control for the providers’ position on the market. Prov_spec, a provider’s specialization in 
each investment style (i.e. UK Equity, Global equity and Mixed High equity), is the ratio of a provider’s 
number of funds within that investment style to all funds the provider offers at a given point in time.  
Finally, a provider’s share of the market is measured as a fraction of the number of its funds to the 
number of funds available on the market (Prov_funds_sh) and as the ratio of the number of its funds 
within a given investment style (i.e. UK equity, Global equity, Mixed High equity) to all the funds 
operating on the market within that investment style (Prov_style_sh). 
Table 2 Panels A, B and C show the estimates of AlphaMOM, AlphaCAPM, AlphaFF5F, AlphaPPB 
MOM, AlphaPPB CAPM and AlphaPPB FF5F for the UK equity, Global equity and Mixed High equity 
respectively. The estimates are similar within each investment style. Also, within each investment style, 
the alphas estimated for GPP funds are statistically significantly larger than the corresponding IPP 
alphas. However, given the sizes of the corresponding standard deviations, none of these alphas are 
statistically significantly different from zero. 
 
************** insert Table 2 here ************** 
 
The summary statistics for the funds’ and providers’ characteristics for the three investment 
styles and the t–tests assessing the statistical significance of the differences between the means of the 
GPP and the IPP variables are shown in Appendix 2.  These statistics show that there are no statistical 
differences between Age of the UK equity GPPs and IPPs, but both the Global equity and the Mixed 
High equity GPPs are younger than their IPP counterparts. Outsourcing is statistically significantly less 
popular among GPPs than IPPs and, on average, GPPs are bigger than IPPs. However, the opposite is 
true for the providers’ size when it is measured by the total number of provider’s funds. When the 





smaller than the IPP providers for the UK equity and the Mixed High equity funds. Also, the market 
share of the GPP providers is smaller in the case of the UK equity and the Mixed High equity funds, 
but larger for the Global equity funds than it is for the corresponding IPP funds. For each investment 
style, the GPP providers are more specialized than the IPP providers. 
 
5. Results 
5.1. Do GPP funds outperform IPP funds? 
Table 2 shows that there are statistically significant differences between the alphas estimated 
for GPPs and IPPs for all three investment styles. However, on average, the GPP and the IPP 
populations differ in their basic characteristics, as the differences between nearly all GPP and IPP 
control variables are statistically significantly different from zero (Table A2.2 in Appendix 2). To assess 
whether differences between the GPP and the IPP alphas persist after controlling for fund and provider 
characteristics, regressions were run with the alphas as the dependent variables and various 
combinations of the funds’ and providers’ characteristics as the independent variables.  Given that 
controlling for fund size considerably reduces the sample size, I first show the results without 
controlling for fund size.  
Table 3 shows the estimated coefficients and the corresponding p–values for the regressions 
that use AlphaMOM as the dependent variable. DGPP, Outsourced, ln(Age), Provider_spec are the 
independent variables common across all the specifications. In addition, four variables are used, one at 
a time, to control for the providers’ size and specialization in the investment style under consideration. 
These are: ln(Prov_funds), ln(Prov_style), Prov_funds_sh and Provider_style_sh. Only one of these 
variables is used at a time as their cross–correlations vary between 0.7 – 0.9. The results are grouped 
per investment style, i.e. first the estimates for the UK equity funds, then the Global equity funds, and 
finally for the Mixed High equity funds are shown.  All the regressions have time dummies and are 
clustered per fund.      
 






Table 3 strongly supports the hypothesis that GPP funds outperformed IPP funds, i.e. all the 
coefficients’ estimates for DGPP are positive and statistically significant at 1%.  Within each investment 
style, the estimated coefficients are very similar to each other regardless of the regression specification. 
The results show that investors saving with GPP UK equity funds earned 0.086 – 0.088% per month 
(or 1.032 – 1.56% per annum) more than investors saving with the IPP UK equity funds. Investors 
saving with the IPP Global equity and IPP Mixed High equity funds were similarly disadvantaged in 
comparison with the equivalent GPP investors.  
The regressions also show that there is a negative relationship between funds’ performance and 
Age, and that in the case of the UK and the Mixed High equity funds this relationship is statistically 
significant at 1%. In contrast to previous studies, outsourcing and performance are positively related. 
The relationship is significant at 1% for the UK equity funds, and 10% for the Global equity funds. 
Providers’ specialization in the specific investment style is positively and statistically significantly 
associated with the fund performance for the UK and the Global equity funds.  
The regressions also indicate that the providers’ absolute and relative size on the pension market 
and in the specific investment style are not associated with the fund performance for the UK and Global 
equity funds. In contrast, they impact statistically significantly negatively on the performance of the 
Mixed High equity funds.  
Finally, the R–squared adjusted vary little across various specifications for each investment 
style.  
Table 4 shows the results analogous to those in Table 3 but this time the regressions control for 
the fund size (natural log of Size was taken). Table 4 confirms the results presented in Table 3, i.e. GPPs 
statistically significantly outperformed IPPs. The estimated DGPP coefficients are slightly larger for the 
UK equity funds and the Mixed High equity funds, and smaller for the Global equity funds when funds’ 
size was controlled for. The relationship between ln(Age) and performance tends to be negative, but the 
estimated coefficients are statistically insignificant. The Outsourcing and the Prov_spec coefficients 
remain positive and statistically significant for the UK equity and the Global equity funds. In addition, 
the Outsourcing coefficients for Mix High equity funds become statistically significant.  The other 





with those shown in Table 3, but their statistical significance declines for the Mixed High equity funds 
and increases for the UK equity funds. 
The coefficients of ln(Size) are negative and statistically insignificant for the UK equity funds, 
and statistically significantly positive for the Global equity and the Mixed High equity funds.  
Table A3.3 (Appendix 3 to save space) shows the results analogous to those presented in Table 
4 but for ln(Size_avr) controlling for fund size. The results presented in both tables (in particular, the 
estimates for DGPP) are very small, yet, the R–squared adjusted are considerably higher for the 
specifications with ln(Size) than with ln(Size_avr).  
To test the robustness of the findings, all the regressions were repeated with AlphaCAPM and 
AlphaFF5F as the dependent variables. To save space and given the similarity to the results shown in 
Tables 3 and 4, the outcomes of these regressions are shown in Appendix 3. 
 
******************* insert Table 4 here ****************** 
 
5.2. Are the results driven by a selection bias? 
As discussed in Section 3, differences in the performance between GPPs and IPPs may result 
from these two groups of funds being run by different types of providers. In total, there were 63 
providers of pension funds of which only 21 serviced both GPP and IPP schemes. Of the remaining 42, 
36 providers offered only IPP funds and six providers offered only GPP funds.  
To test whether the observed differences in fund performance can be explained by unobserved 
provider–specific characteristics which happen to correlate with the type of pensions they provide, I re–
estimated regressions on a sample of only those funds with providers who offered both types of pension 
schemes. Table 5 shows the results. To save space, given the similarity of the results across different 
specifications only the results for the regressions with ln (Prov_funds) are shown.23 For each investment 
style two regression specifications are shown: one without controlling for fund size and one controlling 
for it.   
 
23 Prov_funds was chosen to control for the size of the providers because it had lower correlation with the other 





************* insert Table 5 here ********** 
 
The size of the samples decreased considerably when the restriction of only using funds offered 
by the providers who offer both GPPs and IPPs was imposed. Yet, the results confirm the main 
hypothesis. The estimates of the DGPP coefficients remain positive and statistically significant in all the 
specifications but one (the coefficient estimated for the Mixed High equity funds when the fund size is 
controlled for is not statistically significant). Thus, it can be concluded that narrowing the sample down 
to the funds offered by providers offering both GPPs and IPPs preserved the result, and the poorer 
performance of the IPP funds is not a sample selection phenomenon.  
Differences in the performance of funds can also arise because of unobservable differences in 
investment strategies. Two funds may fall in the same category, e.g. Global equity, but focus on very 
different markets or equity types. However, if they have the same performance benchmarks, it can be 
assumed that we compare like–with–like. Therefore, to minimize the impact of potential differences in 
investment strategies across GPPs and IPPs, two tests were performed. First, the sample was restricted 
to these funds that used the benchmarks common for GPPs and IPPs. Having the same benchmarks 
indicates that funds have some similarity in performance targets, and hence should be expected to have 
similar performance.  
In the second test, the performance of funds was measured against the performance of their 
benchmarks, i.e. the difference between the returns on a fund and its benchmark was used as the 
dependent variable in estimating the alphas, AlphaPPB. The summary statistics of AlphaPPB for each 
investment style are shown in Table 2. The statistics show that for each investment style AlphaPPB MOM, 
AlphaPPB CAPM and AlphaPPB FF5F are comparable. However, there are statistically significant differences 
between each type of the alphas between GPPs and IPPs. Once more, GPPs outperformed IPPs.  
Table 6 Panel A shows the regression results when the sample of funds was restricted to those 
IPPs and GPPs that have the same benchmarks. Table 6 Panel B shows the estimates for the regressions 
when the AlphaPPB MOM were used as the dependent variables. 
 






Table 6 Panel A confirms that GPPs statistically and economically outperformed their IPP 
counterparts with the same benchmarks. All the coefficients estimated for the DGPP dummy are positive 
and statistically significant. The estimates of the other coefficients are in line with the previous results. 
Finally, Table 6 Panel B shows that GPPs performed statistically and economically better against their 
benchmark than the IPP funds did against theirs.  
 
5.3. Does the creation of IGCs make the difference? 
The remaining question is whether the 2015 FCA reform of the investment governance of GPP 
schemes improved their performance, i.e. whether the performance gap between GPPs and IPPs has 
increased after the introduction of IGCs.  To answer this question, I used the interactive term DGPPxDIGC. 
If the gap has widened, the coefficient of the interactive term should be positive.   
To test the impact of fund size and provider size two more interactive terms were added, 
DGPPxDIGCxln(Prov_funds) and DGPPxDIGCxln(Size). If, as conjectured, the introduction of IGCs would 
be more beneficial for smaller funds and providers, then the coefficients estimated for these interactive 
terms should be negative. Table 7 shows the results for the regressions for the three investment styles 
of interest using AlphaMOM and AlphaPPB MOM as the dependent variables.  
 
************  insert Table 7 here   ********** 
 
Table 7 confirms the results presented so far, i.e. there is strong evidence that GPPs 
outperformed IPPs. Moreover, there is considerable evidence that the difference in the performance 
increased after the introduction of IGCs for the Global and Mixed High equity funds. The coefficients 
for DGPPxDIGC estimated for the UK equity funds are positive but not statistically significant. All the 
coefficients are quite large in comparison with the corresponding coefficients estimated for DGPP.  
All the coefficients estimated for the interactive terms for provider size and for fund size are 
negative. Several of them are statistically significant. These results suggest that GPP investors of 
smaller Mixed High GPPs, especially if these schemes were offered by smaller providers benefited most 






6. Accounting for fees 
Even though the gross performance is core in assessing the differences in the funds’ 
performance aptitudes, to obtain the full picture of differences between IPPs and GPPs, fees paid by 
investors should be accounted for.24  
          The basic economic arguments suggest that due to the collective nature of GPP schemes, 
economies of scale can arise for the pension providers resulting in lower costs and, consequently, lower 
fees than those associated with IPP schemes. Lower fees of GPPs may also result from greater 
bargaining power associated with companies who negotiated them.25 
Morningstar Direct does not provide historical data on fees and charges, thus Table 8 shows the 
summary statistics for the annal management charges (AMCs) and the total expense ratios (TERs) as 
of December 2018. The AMCs and the TERs are available for 379 and 248 GPP funds respectively, 
and 5,931 and 6,181 IPP funds respectively.26 Table 8 shows the summary statistics for all the three 
investment styles discussed in the paper as well as for the other 15 styles as specified in Appendix 1. It 
also shows the results of t–tests comparing the means of the GPP and of the IPP populations.   
 
************ insert Table 8 here   ********** 
 
Table 8 shows that the majority of the average AMCs charged by IPPs were greater than one 
percent while all averages of AMCs charged by GPPs were considerably less than one percent. 
Similarly, while only four average TERs of IPPs were below one percent, this was true for 17 average 
GPP TERs. The average AMC across all GPPs was 0.544% and 1.031% for IPPs. The difference 
between them is statistically significant. The corresponding statistics for TER were 0.487% and 1.242% 
and the difference was also highly statistically significant.  
The three investment styles analyzed in the paper also have statistically significantly different 
average AMCs and TERs. The differences between AMCs of IPPs and GPPs were 0.439%, 0.491% 
 
24 This research is not concerned with assessing the size of the amount of money pension fund managers generate 
for themselves and fund families (Berk and van Binsbergen 2015).  
25 Pasiouras (2018) shows that a higher level of consumer protection in developed countries is associated with 
lower cost of financial intermediation in the banking industry. 






and 0.378% for the UK equity, Global equity and the Mixed High equity funds respectively. The 
corresponding TER figures were 0.684%, 0.727% and 0.793%. 
There is no information about loads of IPPs but, given that GPPs do not typically charge for 
switches across funds within the given pension arrangement and switching providers by companies is 
not supposed to generate extra costs for employees, it can only be expected that if these costs were also 
taken into account, then the differences between IPP and GPP funds would increase further. Thus, the 
average IPP investor earned lower returns and paid higher fees in comparison with the average GPP 
investor. 
Most importantly, the differences in fees were smaller than the differences in the fund 
performance. This is an important observation given that the criticism of IPP funds focuses on their 




The unfair treatment of retail investors by financial intermediaries has attracted considerable 
attention in the finance literature. This paper, using monthly data for a large sample of UK personal 
pension funds for the period July 1990 – June 2019, adds to the debate by showing that pension funds 
offered to individuals through group pension agreements facilitated by employers (GPP schemes) 
statistically and economically outperformed pension funds offered directly to the public (IPP schemes).   
The comparison of three–year alphas estimated for the Fama–French Three Factor plus Momentum 
model shows that GPP funds, on average, earned 1% – 1.6% higher gross risk–adjusted returns per 
annum than the IPP funds. These differences in the performance cannot be attributed to a provider 
selection bias, differences in investment objectives or differences in risk attitudes between the IPP and 
the GPP investors.   
I argue that the differences in performance result, at least in part, from the differences in 
investment governance and oversight. Although both GPPs and IPPs are contracts between individual 
investors and providers, informed, third parties (i.e. employers and governance committees) are 





To address the importance of monitoring, I test the impact of the introduction of the 
Independent Governance Committees (IGCs) on the performance gap between IPPs and GPPs and find 
consistent evidence that the gap increased after the IGCs were created. Moreover, the performance gap 
increased more for smaller providers and smaller GPPs which is consistent with the documented 
evidence that smaller employers were less engaged in monitoring and oversight prior to the reform 
(OFT, 2013).   
I also document that the gap between the GPPs’ and the IPPs’ performance increases further 
when the fees are accounted for. The existing data suggest that, on average across all investment styles, 
the difference between GPP and IPP funds’ total expense ratios (TER) is about 0.755%.  Combining 
this difference in fees with the difference in performance means that, other things being equal, the 
average IPP investor may have in his/her pension pot half of the money the average GPP investor has 
after 30 years of saving for retirement even though the amount they put aside is the same.  
It is also important to note that the difference in the performance between GPPs and IPPs is 
greater than the difference in fees.  While the attention of the press and pension activists concentrates 
on unfair charges of IPPs, my research shows that there is a much bigger, yet totally hidden from the 
public eye, issue – the underperformance of these funds in comparison of their GPP counterparts. This 
is an important finding with many policymaking and regulatory consequences. 
Given the superior performance of GPP funds one might ask why IPP funds are not driven from 
the market. Both types of pension schemes have been in co–existence because they have been servicing 
relatively disjoint markets, and because, this far, politicians, policy–makers and regulators, have been 
more focused on employer–based pension schemes (including GPPs) than on individual personal 
pensions.   
Taken together, the results have important policy–making implications. They suggest that 
individual investors need more protection from regulatory bodies than it is currently provided. In 
particular, the results suggest that empowering individual investors may not be enough to solve the 
problem of weak performance of pension funds. IPPs need more institutional oversight in the way GPPs 
have. Thus, given that IGCs can positively impact on GPPs performance, their role could be extended 
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Table 1. Summary statistics of the main investment styles of GPP and IPP funds. 
 GPP  IPP 
 N  N %  N w/ size  N w/ size %  Size  Size %  N  N %  N w/ 
size 
 N w/ size 
% 
 Size  Size % 
Equity                         
UK 82  11.82  25  12.20  4,069.5  13.77  1,423  15.38  867  17.52  139,163.8  9.15 
Global 122  17.58  29  14.15  4,096.4  13.86  1,015  10.97  578  11.68  84,129.9  5.53 
Other equity 202  14.7  37  18.05  1,870.2  6.33  1,686  18.21  982  19.84  69,965.7  4.61 
Mixed            
 
           
High equity 56  8.07  17  8.29  9,898.8  33.49 
 
1,114  12.04  598  12.08  681,509.8  44.82 
Low equity 5  0.72  2  0.98  322.9  1.09 
 
681  7.36  355  7.17  63,176.56  4.16 
                        
Fixed income 136  19.6  50  24.39  4,111.2  13.91  1,238  13.38  697  14.09  68,785.7  4.52 
Other styles 191  27.51  45  21.96  51,89.6  17.56  2,098  22.66  872  17.61  413,746.5  27.21 
Total 694  100.0  205  100.00  29,558.2  100.00  9,255  100.0  4949  100.0  1,520,478  100.0 
Notes: The table shows how many funds counted as primary asset classes (N) existed for each individual investment style for GPP and IPP 
schemes as of June 2019; how many of these funds had at least one observation of size (N w/ size) in January – June 2019, and the average size of 












Table 2. Summary statistics of the fund performance variables and the t–test statistics. 
 GPP  IPP  t-test 
 N  Mean  St dev  N  Mean  St dev  Diff  t-stat 
Panel A: UK equity                
AlphaMOM 7,092  0.573  0.722  130,197  0.541  0.677  0.031***  3.457 
AlphaCAPM 7,092  0.579  0.671  130,197  0.588  0.720  0.039***  4.695 
AlphaFF5F 7,092  0.616  0.716  130,197  0.542  0.726  0.029***  3.276 
AlphaPPB MOM 6,236  0.049  0.249  94,559  0.024  0.305  0.025***  6.370 
AlphaPPB CAPM 6,236  0.053  0.246  94,559  0.026  0.300  0.027***  6.916 
AlphaPPB FF5F 6,236  0.059  0.253  94,559  0.034  0.314  0.024***  6.036 
Panel B: Global equity               
AlphaMOM 10,753  0.099  0.296  93,670  -0.003  0.381  0.101***  26.688 
AlphaCAPM 10,753  0.138  0.292  93,672  0.040  0.389  0.098***  25.311 
AlphaFF5F 10,753  0.086  0.295  93,670  -0.010  0.381  0.096***  25.187 
AlphaPPB MOM 5,396  -0.024  0.221  58,854  -0.083  0.288  0.059***  14.671 
AlphaPPB CAPM 5,396  -0.032  0.227  58,854  -0.099  0.297  0.066***  16.012 
AlphaPPB FF5F 5,396  -0.029  0.237  58,854  -0.094  0.294  0.065***  15.670 
Panel C: Mixed High equity               
AlphaMOM 5,466  -0.012  0.189  114,163  -0.099  0.220  0.087***  28.725 
AlphaCAPM 5,466  -0.005  0.200  114,163  -0.104  0.219  0.099***  32.697 
AlphaFF5F 5,466  -0.022  0.198  114,163  -0.107  0.225  0.085***  27.371 
AlphaPPB MOM 2,331  0.041  0.236  53,279  -0.011  0.236  0.052***  10.485 
AlphaPPB CAPM 2,331  0.052  0.235  53,279  -0.009  0.238  0.061***  12.080 
AlphaPPB FF5F 2,331  0.051  0.236  53,279  -0.011  0.242  0.062***  12.074 
Notes: Alpha(.) and AlphaPPB(.) are three-year window estimates of the alpha coefficients for models as specified in the subscripts, i.e. MOM 
is the Fama–French Three Factor Model with Momentum, CAPM is the CAPM, and FF5F is the Fama–French Five Factor Model; each 
model has four additional factors (UK TERM, GL TERM, UK DFLT and GL DFLT) for the Mixed High equity funds. The PPB subscript 
indicates that the performance was measured against the Primary Prospectus Benchmarks. The statistics were calculated for July 1990 – June 
2019 for the UK equity and the Global equity funds, and for April 2004 – June 2019 for the Mixed High equity funds. N is the number of 






Table 3.  Regressions with AlphaMOM as the dependent variable. 
 
 UK equity  Global equity  Mixed High equity 
DGPP 0.088***  0.089***  0.086***  0.086***  0.087***  0.087***  0.087***  0.086***  0.079***  0.072***  0.077***  0.071*** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
ln(Age) -0.040***  -0.040***  -0.040***  -0.040***  -0.014  -0.014  -0.014  -0.013  -0.019***  -0.020***  -0.019***  -0.020*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.261)  (0.260)  (0.257)  (0.266)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
Outsourced 0.059***  0.058***  0.061***  0.060***  0.033*  0.033*  0.033*  0.032*  0.005  0.007  0.004  0.004 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.074)  (0.071)  (0.074)  (0.085)  (0.577)  (0.493)  (0.639)  (0.686) 
Prov_spec 0.451***  0.429***  0.439***  0.398***  0.177**  0.184**  0.171*  0.228***  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.036)  (0.019)  (0.053)  (0.003)  (0.532)  (0.184)  (0.527)  (0.118) 
ln(Prov_funds) 0.005        -0.002        -0.007*       
 (0.388)        (0.777)        (0.094)       
ln(Prov_style)   0.007        -0.003        -0.011***     
   (0.298)        (0.675)        (0.007)     
Prov_funds_sh     0.118        -0.066        -0.343**   
     (0.542)        (0.702)        (0.033)   
Prov_style_sh       0.196        -0.044        -0.394*** 
       (0.221)        (0.816)        (0.003) 
Constant 0.601***  0.611***  0.618***  0.621***  0.374***  0.373***  0.373***  0.361***  0.217***  0.221***  0.196***  0.200*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
R2adj 0.712  0.712  0.712  0.712  0.444  0.444  0.444  0.444  0.224  0.226  0.226  0.229 
N 136,555  136,555  136,555  136,555  103,288  103,288  103,288  103,057  112,991  112,991  112,991  112,991 
Notes: AlphaMOM was estimated from three–year moving windows for the Fama–French Three Factor Model with Momentum. DGPP is equal to one for GPP funds and zero otherwise. All regressions have yearly 









Table 4.  Regressions with AlphaMOM as the dependent variable when funds’ size (ln(Size)) is controlled for. 
 UK equity  Global equity  Mixed High equity 
DGPP 0.141***  0.140**  0.142***  0.139**  0.080***  0.079***  0.074***  0.071***  0.110***  0.101***  0.111***  0.107*** 
 (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
ln(Age) -0.014  -0.014  -0.014  -0.015  0.008  0.009  0.010  0.010  -0.010  -0.012  -0.010  -0.012 
 (0.329)  (0.328)  (0.328)  (0.320)  (0.558)  (0.552)  (0.506)  (0.482)  (0.161)  (0.107)  (0.151)  (0.103) 
Outsourced 0.046*  0.047*  0.047*  0.047*  0.047**  0.054**  0.047**  0.044**  0.033***  0.035***  0.032***  0.032*** 
 (0.071)  (0.071)  (0.058)  (0.054)  (0.023)  (0.015)  (0.030)  (0.040)  (0.007)  (0.004)  (0.007)  (0.006) 
ln(Size) -0.005  -0.005  -0.006  -0.006  0.007**  0.008**  0.007**  0.006**  0.003  0.004*  0.003*  0.004* 
 (0.145)  (0.148)  (0.129)  (0.141)  (0.020)  (0.017)  (0.024)  (0.042)  (0.102)  (0.060)  (0.088)  (0.051) 
Prov_spec 0.444***  0.425***  0.430***  0.367*  0.257*  0.192  0.279*  0.363***  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.004)  (0.076)  (0.057)  (0.148)  (0.061)  (0.002)  (0.821)  (0.682)  (0.818)  (0.647) 
ln(Prov_funds) 0.005        0.011        -0.004       
 (0.613)        (0.235)        (0.361)       
ln(Prov_style)   0.005        0.005        -0.010**     
   (0.637)        (0.653)        (0.031)     
Prov_funds_sh     0.288        0.420*        -0.158   
     (0.306)        (0.085)        (0.273)   
Prov_style_sh       0.178        0.471*        -0.251** 
       (0.491)        (0.072)        (0.026) 
Constant 0.458***  0.469***  0.480***  0.494***  -0.758***  -0.716***  -0.726***  -0.727***  0.225***  0.231***  0.207***  0.207*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
R2adj 0.681  0.681  0.681  0.681  0.403  0.402  0.403  0.404  0.213  0.215  0.213  0.215 
N 36,745  36,745  36,745  36,745  37,314  37,314  37,314  37,104  51,232  51,232  51,232  51,232 
Notes: AlphaMOM was estimated from three–year moving windows for the Fama–French Three Factor Model with Momentum. DGPP is equal to one for GPP funds and zero otherwise. All regressions have yearly fixed 






















Table 5. Regressions with AlphaMOM as the dependent variable when only funds offered by providers who service both GPP and IPP 
schemes were included in the sample. 
 UK equity  GL equity  Mixed High equity 
DGPP 0.146**  0.168**  0.069***  0.038*  0.041*  -0.003 
 (0.029)  (0.014)  (0.000)  (0.066)  (0.050)  (0.908) 
ln(Age) -0.028*  -0.023  -0.015  -0.004  -0.015*  0.005 
 (0.086)  (0.217)  (0.308)  (0.839)  (0.058)  (0.561) 
Outsourced 0.056**  0.042  0.034  0.014  0.000  0.037** 
 (0.020)  (0.149)  (0.115)  (0.521)  (0.992)  (0.014) 
ln(Size)   -0.006    0.002    0.001 
   (0.231)    (0.567)    (0.565) 
Prov_spec 0.885***  0.571***  0.029  0.071  -0.565***  -0.312* 
 (0.000)  (0.004)  (0.769)  (0.565)  (0.002)  (0.092) 
ln(Prov_funds) 0.006  0.025  -0.015  -0.006  -0.029***  -0.022** 
 (0.711)  (0.128)  (0.107)  (0.593)  (0.006)  (0.030) 
Constant 0.571***  0.367**  0.494***  -0.501***  0.382***  0.224** 
 (0.000)  (0.014)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.015) 
R2adjusted 0.714  0.687  0.448  0.390  0.227  0.239 
N 60,208  26,477  76,307  26,585  77,018  34,048 
Notes: AlphaMOM was estimated from three–year moving windows for the Fama–French Three Factor Model with Momentum. DGPP is 
equal to one for GPP funds and zero otherwise. All regressions have yearly fixed effects and are clustered by fund. N is the number of 














Table 6. Primary Prospectus Benchmarks’ related performance. 
 UK equity  Global equity  Mixed High equity 
Panel A: GPP and IPP funds have the same Primary Prospectus Benchmark, AlphaMOM is the dependent variable 
DGPP 0.098***  0.163**  0.091***  0.083***  0.088***  0.066** 
 (0.002)  (0.016)  (0.000)  (0.008)  (0.010)  (0.020) 
ln(Age) -0.020*  0.009  -0.023*  -0.006  -0.052***  -0.044** 
 (0.069)  (0.574)  (0.062)  (0.661)  (0.003)  (0.010) 
Outsourced 0.068***  0.084***  0.013  0.058**  -0.008  0.003 
 (0.000)  (0.005)  (0.472)  (0.030)  (0.676)  (0.918) 
ln(Size)   0.002    0.012***    -0.004 
   (0.598)    (0.004)    (0.440) 
Prov_spec 0.373***  0.236  0.310**  0.338*  -1.299***  -1.854*** 
 (0.000)  (0.150)  (0.013)  (0.094)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
ln(Prov_funds) 0.002  -0.006  0.015  0.019  0.014  0.054** 
 (0.804)  (0.613)  (0.113)  (0.164)  (0.452)  (0.021) 
Constant 0.514***  0.311**  0.365***  -0.839***  0.453***  0.303* 
 (0.000)  (0.028)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.060) 
R2adjusted 0.701  0.685  0.419  0.380  0.310  0.256 
N 92,504  24,482  56,367  23,678  15,628  7,722 
Panel B: AlphaPPB MOM is the dependent variable 
DGPP 0.078***  0.152***  0.066***  0.098***  0.064*  0.266*** 
 (0.003)  (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.008)  (0.086)  (0.000) 
ln(Age) -0.019  -0.005  -0.011  0.009  -0.028**  -0.024* 
 (0.101)  (0.776)  (0.483)  (0.636)  (0.038)  (0.062) 
Outsourced 0.077***  0.065***  0.008  0.065**  0.031  0.066*** 
 (0.000)  (0.004)  (0.669)  (0.021)  (0.115)  (0.001) 
ln(Size)   -0.002    0.019***    0.008** 
   (0.570)    (0.000)    (0.032) 
Prov_spec 0.253**  0.016  0.063  0.170  -0.002  -0.026 
 (0.017)  (0.915)  (0.565)  (0.331)  (0.504)  (0.312) 
ln(Prov_funds) -0.003  -0.004  0.014  0.018  -0.006  -0.006 
 (0.699)  (0.702)  (0.135)  (0.194)  (0.490)  (0.566) 
Constant 0.291***  0.172  0.074  -0.450***  0.233***  0.241*** 
 (0.000)  (0.197)  (0.556)  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.008) 
R2adj 0.087  0.076  0.039  0.070  0.029  0.062 
N 100,147  28,182  63,386  25,951  52,365  25,830 
Notes: AlphaMOM was estimated from three–year moving windows for the Fama–French Three Factor Model with Momentum. AlphaPPB 
MOM was estimated from three-year moving windows for the Fama–French Three Factor Model with Momentum for the difference in 
returns on funds and their Primary Prospectus Benchmarks. DGPP is equal to one for GPP funds and zero otherwise. All regressions have 
yearly fixed effects and are clustered by funds. N is the number of monthly observations. P-values are shows in parenthesis. *** - 1% 
















Table 7. Impact of the creation of Independent Governance Committees (IGCs). 
 UK equity  GL equity  Mixed High equity 
 AlphaMOM  AlphaPPB MOM  AlphaMOM  AlphaPPB MOM  AlphaMOM  AlphaPPB MOM 
DGPP 0.217***  0.164***  0.107***  0.118**  0.076**  0.268*** 
 (0.000)  (0.004)  (0.000)  (0.018)  (0.011)  (0.000) 
DGPPxDIGC 0.275  0.388  0.197  0.475**  0.296*  0.142*** 
 (0.502)  (0.298)  (0.341)  (0.015)  (0.079)  (0.002) 
DGPPxDIGCx 
ln(Prov_funds) -0.002  -0.054***  -0.011  -0.028**  -0.032*  -0.150*** 
 (0.927)  (0.009)  (0.273)  (0.017)  (0.058)  (0.000) 
DGPPxDIGCx ln(Size) -0.021  -0.008  -0.010  -0.019**  -0.004  -0.078*** 
 (0.325)  (0.607)  (0.295)  (0.029)  (0.576)  (0.010) 
ln(Age) -0.014  -0.005  0.008  0.009  -0.009  -0.024* 
 (0.345)  (0.743)  (0.596)  (0.623)  (0.217)  (0.065) 
Outsourced 0.048*  0.063***  0.047**  0.065**  0.032***  0.066*** 
 (0.063)  (0.006)  (0.028)  (0.020)  (0.008)  (0.001) 
ln(Size) -0.005  -0.002  0.008**  0.019***  0.003  0.008** 
 (0.206)  (0.546)  (0.019)  (0.000)  (0.118)  (0.036) 
Prov_spec 0.459***  0.017  0.249*  0.150  0.000  -0.026 
 (0.002)  (0.907)  (0.064)  (0.381)  (0.815)  (0.312) 
ln(Prov_funds) 0.004  -0.001  0.012  0.020  -0.003  -0.003 
 (0.663)  (0.923)  (0.226)  (0.152)  (0.547)  (0.809) 
Constant 0.302***  0.007  -0.846***  -0.572***  0.102*  -0.044 
 (0.007)  (0.956)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.067)  (0.660) 
R2adj 0.681  0.079  0.403  0.072  0.215  0.067 
N 36,745  28,182  37,266  25,945  51,281  25,830 
Notes: AlphaMOM (estimated from three–year moving windows for the Fama–French Three Factor Model with Momentum) or AlphaPPB 
MOM (estimated from three-year moving windows for the Fama–French Three Factor Model with Momentum for the difference in returns 
on funds and their Primary Prospectus Benchmark) are the dependent variables. DGPP is equal to one for GPP funds and zero otherwise. 
DIGC is equal to one for April 2015 – June 2019, and zero otherwise. All regressions have yearly fixed effects and are clustered by funds. 










Table 8. Summary statistics for the annual management fees (AMC) and the total expense ratios (TER) and t–test results. 
  GPP  IPP  t–test 
  N  Mean  St dev  N  Mean  St dev  Diff  t–stat 





UK 53  0.704  0.321  909  1.143  0.530  -0.439***  -9.261 
Global 78  0.587  0.340  622  1.078  0.649  -0.491***  -10.55 
North America 11  0.455  0.333  238  1.138  0.552  -0.684***  -6.417 
Europe 14  0.676  0.454  302  1.255  0.619  -0.579***  -4.584 
Japan 8  0.504  0.314  145  1.116  0.514  -0.612***  -5.145 
Asia 11  0.535  0.331  202  1.192  0.627  -0.657***  -6.025 
Emerging 18  0.704  0.318  194  1.278  0.535  -0.574***  -6.806 





High equity 37  0.631  0.339  702  1.009  0.776  -0.378***  -6.001 
Low equity 5  0.590  0.459  468  1.026  0.573 
 
-0.436***  -2.110 








Gilts 15  0.297  0.258  175  0.774  0.475  -0.478***  -6.312 
Corporate High Yield 2  0.400  0.071  196  1.141  0.477  -0.741***  -12.244 
Corporate Investment Grade 47  0.377  0.262  312  0.883  0.489  -0.506***  -10.730 
Global 5  0.280  0.271  102  0.991  0.452  -0.711***  -5.501 




Money Market 8  0.261  0.306  150  0.855  0.810  -0.594***  -4.680 
Property 10  0.870  0.433  127  1.101  0.457  -0.231  -1.6158 
Specialist 13  0.793  0.415  508  0.927  0.497  -0.135  -1.148 
Unclassified  40  0.283  0.205  433  0.596  0.447  -0.312***  -8.036 
Other 4  0.765  0.406  146  1.266  0.483  -0.501***  -2.421 
 Total 379  0.544  0.357  5,931  1.031  0.605  -0.487***  -24.420 





UK 26  0.637  0.422  930  1.322  0.988  -0.684***  -7.702 
Global 45  0.548  0.366  641  1.275  0.956  -0.727***  -10.959 
North America 7  0.317  0.333  252  1.335  1.247  -1.018***  -6.869 
Europe 9  0.560  0.497  354  1.525  1.423  -0.965***  -5.297 
Japan 5  0.406  0.369  159  1.347  1.201  -0.941***  -4.939 
Asia 9  0.523  0.356  210  1.399  1.112  -0.876***  -6.203 
Emerging 17  0.690  0.414  220  1.399  0.521  -0.709***  -6.664 





High equity 22  0.503  0.284  742  1.296  1.041  -0.793***  -11.080 
Low equity 4  0.393  0.406  502  1.323  1.078  -0.930***  -4.464 







e Gilts 9  0.237  0.128  151  0.826  0.804  -0.590***  -7.557 
Corporate High Yield 4  0.668  0.247  239  1.277  1.096  -0.610***  -4.286 
Corporate Investment Grade 30  0.269  0.150  314  0.993  0.964  -0.724***  -11.896 
Global 5  0.166  0.073  116  1.334  1.535  -1.169***  -7.991 




Money Market 4  0.125  0.024  112  0.795  0.671  -670***  -10.392 
Property 7  1.051  0.603  122  1.334  0.945  -0.282  -1.161 
Specialist 11  0.872  0.420  485  1.182  0.727  -0.310***  -2.367 
Unclassified  32  0.274  0.194  470  0.754  0.736  -0.480***  -9.940 
Other 2  0.580  0.467  162  1.459  0.860  -0.879***  -2.609 
 Total 248  0.487  0.382  6,181  1.242  1.026  -0.755***  -27.414 
Notes: The AMC and TER are as of December 2018. Diff is the difference between the GPP mean and the IPP mean.  *** - 1% significance, ** – 











Appendix 1 (online) 
 
Table A1.1. Specifications of investment styles. 
Asset Class  Investment styles  ABI PC classification 
Equity   UK equity  UK All Companies, UK Smaller Companies, UK Equity Income 
  Europe equity  Europe excl. UK Equities Europe incl. UK Equities 
  North America equity  North America Equities 
  Japan equity  Japan Equities 
  Global equity  Global Equities 
  Emerging equity  Global Emerging Markets Equities 
  Asia equity  Asia Pacific excl. Japan Equities, Asia Pacific incl. Japan Equities 
     
Mixed  High equity  Mixed Investment 40-85 Shares Flexible Investment 
  Low equity  Mixed Investment 0-35 Shares Mixed Investment 20-60 Shares 
     
Fixed Income  Gilts  UK Gilt, UK Index-Linked Gilts 
  Corporate High Yield  Sterling High Yield Sterling Strategic Bond 
  Corporate Investment Grade  Sterling Long Bond, Sterling Corporate Bond, Sterling Fixed Interest 
  Global  Global Fixed Interest, Global High Yield 
     
Rest  Money Market  Money Market, Deposit & Treasury 
  Property  UK Property Securities, UK Direct Property, Global Property 
  Specialist  Specialist 
  Other   Protected/Guaranteed Funds, Commodity/Energy 





















Table A1.2. Summary statistics of GPP and the IPP funds. 
  GPP  IPP 





UK 82  11.82  25  12.20  4,069.5  13.77  1,423  15.38  867  17.52  139,163.8  9.15 
Global 122  17.58  29  14.15  4,096.4  13.86  1,015  10.97  578  11.68  84,129.9  5.53 
North America 19  2.74  7  3.41  392.9  1.33  375  4.05  208  4.20  28,848.9  1.90 
Europe 21  3.03  6  2.93  331.9  1.12  481  5.20  290  5.86  17,775.7  1.17 
Japan 18  2.59  6  2.93  123.4  0.42  226  2.44  136  2.75  9,064.1  0.60 
Asia 20  2.88  6  2.93  259.5  0.88  303  3.27  179  3.62  9,532.1  0.63 
Emerging 24  3.46  12  5.85  762.5  2.58  301  3.25  169  3.41  4,744.9  0.31 
             
 





High equity 56  8.07  17  8.29  9,898.8  33.49 
 
1114  12.04  598  12.08  681,509.8  44.82 
Low equity 5  0.72  2  0.98  322.9  1.09  681  7.36  355  7.17  63,176.56  4.16 








Gilts 36  5.19  13  6.34  987.1  3.34  268  2.90  133  2.69  24,975.4  1.64 
Corporate High Yield 8  1.15  5  2.44  10.9  0.04  296  3.20  207  4.18  3,507.9  0.23 
Corporate Investment Grade 82  11.82  30  14.63  3,103.6  10.50  515  5.56  275  5.56  35,118.9  2.31 
Global 10  1.44  2  0.98  9.6  0.03  159  1.72  82  1.66  5,183.5  0.34 




Money Market 25  3.60  11  5.37  900.4  3.05  296  3.20  154  3.11  3,0256.6  1.99 
Property 18  2.59  8  3.90  1017.9  3.44  204  2.20  116  2.34  69,780.7  4.59 
Specialist 20  2.88  6  2.93  2,042.9  6.91  713  7.70  357  7.21  217,902.6  14.33 
Unclassified  123  17.72  19  9.27  1,188.2  4.02  658  7.11  137  2.77  94,323.1  6.20 
Other 5  0.72  1  0.49  40.2  0.14  227  2.45  108  2.18  1,483.5  0.10 
 Total 694  100.0  205  100.00  29,558.2  100.00  9,255  100.0  4949  100.0  1,520,478  100.0 
Notes: The table shows how many funds counted as primary asset classes (N) existed for each individual investment style for GPP and IPP schemes as of June 2019; how many of these funds had at least one observation of 





Appendix 2  
Table A2.1. Summary statistics of the risk factors. 
 N  Mean  St. dev  Min  Max 
EU Market 306  0.428  4.445  -14.814  13.699 
EU SMB 306  0.101  3.221  -9.326  12.246 
EU HML 306  0.406  3.475  -9.357  15.385 
EU RMW  306  0.478  3.119  -8.419  14.074 
EU CMA 306  0.338  3.355  -11.535  16.340 
EU MOM 306  1.024  4.872  -28.517  21.514 
GL Market 306  0.437  4.238  -16.251  11.559 
GL SMB 306  0.119  3.379  -11.006  13.782 
GL HML 306  0.380  3.476  -8.232  14.910 
GL RMW 306  0.517  3.165  -7.172  14.840 
GL CMA 306  0.307  3.353  -10.579  15.347 
GL MOM 306  0.719  4.861  -26.737  20.918 
UK TERM 207  0.456  2.881  -8.693  10.113 
UK DFLT 207  -0.031  2.012  -7.464  5.950 
GL TERM 207  0.373  2.641  -12.297  8.077 
GL DFLT 207  -0.081  2.179  -11.055  10.252 
Notes: The table summarises the characteristics of the monthly time series of the European equity (EU) and of the global 
equity (GL) risk factors for the Fama–French Five Factor Model (Market, HML, SMB, RMW and CMA) and the Momentum 
factor (MOM) for July 1990 – June 2019. It also summarises the UK and the global (GL) risk factors for the fixed income 










Table A2.2. Summary statistics of the control variables and the t–test statistics. 
 GPP  IPP  t-test 
 N  Mean  St dev  N  Mean  St dev  Diff  t-stat 
Panel A: UK equity                
Age 11,902  126.27  99.073  172,656  125.65  97.689  0.614  0.663 
Outsourced 21,256  0.115  0.319  326,543  0.681  0.466  -0.566***  170.0 
Size (£m) 2,253  610.9  3387.4  62,673  228.2  1073.6  382.65***  14.519 
Size_avr (£m) 3,202  654.0  3660.5  66,011  235.8  1074.0  418.21***  17.622 
Prov_spec 20,289  0.169  0.073  314,386  0.162  0.061  0.006***  13.822 
Prov_funds 21,256  315.75  420.18  326,543  424.8  466.7  -109.09***  -33.216 
Prov_style 21,256  53.652  71.534  326,543  70.515  77.127  -16.004***  -29.962 
Prov_funds_sh  21,256  0.038  0.050  326,543  0.048  0.044  -0.010***  -33.977 
Prov_style_sh 21,256  0.037  0.047  326,543  0.048  0.042  -0.010***  -30.835 
Panel B: Global equity               
Age 23,822  111.93  83.30  129,238  134.1  104.5  -22.176***  -30.986 
Outsourced 41,134  0.298  0.457  229,839  0.598  0.490  -0.300***  -120.00 
Size (£m) 3,520  404.6  987.7  44,270  159.1  635.3  245.51***  21.000 
Size_avr (£m) 4,972  357.2  985.5  46,557  151.0  556.0  206.12***  22.619 
Prov_spec 39,406  0.179  0.146  224,606  0.136  0.132  0.044***  59.638 
Prov_funds 41,134  386.0  442.1  229,839  472.5  477.8  -86.518***  -34.201 
Prov_style 41,134  57.71  63.85  229,839  53.415  52.762  4.292***  14.686 
Prov_funds_sh  41,134  0.041  0.044  229,839  0.049  0.039  0.008***  38.320 
Prov_style_sh 41,134  0.049  0.045  229,211  0.048  0.035  0.001***  3.494 
Panel C: Mixed High equity               
Age 10,812  148.45  123.91  202,080  169.1  224.4  -20.635***  -9.486 
Outsourced 19,880  0.161  0.367  401,347  0.547  0.498  -0.386***  -120.0 
Size 2,335  454.46  773.70  70,072  1059.6  3551.9  -605.14***  -8.226 
Size_avr 3,020  436.77  772.45  74,651  990.0  3396.2  -553.23***  -8.942 
Prov_spec 7,455  0.144  0.039  354,830  0.137  0.065  0.008***  10.491 
Prov_funds 19,495  285.96  350.31  387,262  456.42  492.66  -170.46***  -47.705 
Prov_style 7,455  67.554  56.375  366,202  80.043  85.212  -12.490***  -12.599 
Prov_funds_sh  19,880  0.029  0.028  401,347  0.055  0.043  -0.026***  -84.066 
Prov_style_sh 7,455  0.049  0.025  366,202  0.061  0.072  -0.013***  -15.036 
Notes: Age is the number of months since funds’ inception. Outsourced equals one for funds under external management and zero for funds 
managed internally. Size is the size of funds as surveyed and Size_avr is to three-year moving average of size as surveyed. Prov_spec is the 
ratio of the number of a provider’s funds in the given investment style to all its funds. Prov_funds is the number of a provider’s funds. 
Prov_style is the number of a provider’s funds in the given investment style. Prov_funds_sh is the ratio of the number of a provider’s funds 
to the number of all funds in the market. Prov_style_sh is the number of a provider’s funds in the given investment style to the number of all 
funds in the market in that investment style. All Size and Size_avr were calculated for January 2007 – June 2019. The other statistics were 
calculated for July 1990 – June 2019 for the UK equity and the Global equity funds, and for April 2004 – June 2019 for the Mixed High 
equity funds. N is the number of monthly observations. Diff is the difference between the GPP and the IPP means with *** – 1% significance, 






Table A3.1. Table equivalent to Table 3 when AlphaCAPM  is the dependent variable 
 UK equity  GL equity  Mixed High equity 
DGPP 0.095***  0.096***  0.092***  0.092***  0.079***  0.079***  0.079***  0.078***  0.091***  0.085***  0.089***  0.083*** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
ln(Age) -0.043***  -0.042***  -0.043***  -0.043***  -0.022**  -0.022**  -0.022**  -0.022**  -0.018***  -0.018***  -0.017***  -0.018*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.031)  (0.031)  (0.029)  (0.031)  (0.004)  (0.002)  (0.003)  (0.002) 
Outsourced 0.054***  0.053***  0.056***  0.055***  0.023  0.023  0.024  0.022  0.003  0.004  0.003  0.002 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.124)  (0.130)  (0.114)  (0.142)  (0.744)  (0.649)  (0.788)  (0.850) 
Prov_spec 0.430***  0.406***  0.412***  0.378***  0.114  0.118*  0.100  0.135**  0.152***  0.156***  0.134***  0.138*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.103)  (0.070)  (0.162)  (0.043)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
ln(Prov_funds) 0.006        -0.001        -0.010**       
 (0.327)        (0.910)        (0.012)       
ln(Prov_style)   0.008        0.000        -0.361**     
   (0.218)        (0.998)        (0.026)     
Prov_funds_sh     0.095        -0.073        -0.392***   
     (0.629)        (0.634)        (0.003)   
Prov_style_sh       0.163        0.016        0.006*** 
       (0.309)        (0.925)        (0.002) 
Constant 0.741***  0.751***  0.762***  0.764***  0.556***  0.553***  0.561***  0.548***  0.152***  0.156***  0.134***  0.138*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
R2adj 0.730  0.730  0.730  0.730  0.508  0.508  0.508  0.508  0.217  0.219  0.219  0.222 
N 136,555  136,555  136,555  136,555  103,290  103,290  103,290  103,059  112,991  112,991  112,991  112,991 
Notes: AlphaCAPM was estimated from three–year moving windows for the CAPM. DGPP is equal to one for GPP funds and zero otherwise. All regressions have yearly fixed effects and are clustered by fund. N is the 












Table A3.2. Table equivalent to Table 3 when AlphaFF5F is the dependent variable 
 UK equity  GL equity  Mixed High equity 
DGPP 0.074***  0.075***  0.072***  0.073***  0.087***  0.087***  0.087***  0.085***  0.075***  0.069***  0.073***  0.067*** 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
ln(Age) -0.034***  -0.034***  -0.035***  -0.035***  -0.012  -0.012  -0.012  -0.012  -0.020***  -0.021***  -0.020***  -0.021*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.265)  (0.263)  (0.267)  (0.282)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
Outsourced 0.047***  0.046***  0.048***  0.047***  0.026  0.027  0.026  0.025  0.002  0.003  0.001  0.000 
 (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.112)  (0.106)  (0.117)  (0.142)  (0.868)  (0.767)  (0.917)  (0.966) 
Prov_spec 0.358***  0.347***  0.345***  0.331***  0.081  0.083  0.088  0.117  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.001 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.326)  (0.288)  (0.318)  (0.145)  (0.554)  (0.218)  (0.551)  (0.129) 
ln(Prov_funds) 0.003        -0.001        -0.006       
 (0.616)        (0.891)        (0.164)       
ln(Prov_style)   0.004        -0.002        -0.010**     
   (0.468)        (0.757)        (0.015)     
Prov_funds_sh     0.017        0.009        -0.331**   
     (0.926)        (0.957)        (0.043)   
Prov_style_sh       0.095        0.053        -0.394*** 
       (0.544)        (0.770)        (0.003) 
Constant 0.621***  0.624***  0.634***  0.632***  0.404***  0.405***  0.399***  0.389***  0.205***  0.210***  0.187***  0.192*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
R2adj 0.718  0.718  0.718  0.718  0.432  0.432  0.432  0.432  0.200  0.202  0.202  0.205 
N 136,555  136,555  136,555  136,555  103,288  103,288  103,288  103,057  112,991  112,991  112,991  112,991 
Notes: AlphaFF5F was estimated from three–year moving windows for the Fama–French Five Factor Model. DGPP is equal to one for GPP funds and zero otherwise. All regressions have yearly fixed effects and are 













Table A3.3. Table equivalent to Table 4 when ln(Size_avr) controls for funds’ size. 
 UK equity  Global equity  Mixed High equity 
DGPP 0.116***  0.115***  0.112***  0.110***  0.060***  0.060***  0.055***  0.053***  0.100***  0.094***  0.100***  0.096*** 
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
ln(Age) -0.025*  -0.025*  -0.025*  -0.026*  -0.000  -0.000  0.001  0.001  -0.008  -0.009  -0.008  -0.009 
 (0.074)  (0.070)  (0.071)  (0.058)  (0.989)  (0.988)  (0.960)  (0.951)  (0.277)  (0.221)  (0.259)  (0.218) 
Outsourced 0.029  0.029  0.033  0.031  0.022  0.027  0.018  0.016  0.016  0.018  0.016  0.016 
 (0.184)  (0.191)  (0.130)  (0.149)  (0.235)  (0.165)  (0.360)  (0.404)  (0.166)  (0.123)  (0.166)  (0.162) 
ln(Size_avr) -0.016***  -0.016***  -0.016***  -0.016***  0.004  0.004  0.003  0.003  0.002  0.003  0.002  0.003 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.199)  (0.166)  (0.262)  (0.339)  (0.235)  (0.174)  (0.206)  (0.157) 
Prov_spec 0.334***  0.241**  0.315***  0.044  0.093  0.062  0.144  0.179  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 (0.004)  (0.037)  (0.005)  (0.753)  (0.396)  (0.565)  (0.261)  (0.104)  (0.752)  (0.655)  (0.747)  (0.620) 
ln(Prov_funds) 0.023***        0.005        -0.003       
 (0.003)        (0.572)        (0.503)       
ln(Prov_style)   0.024***        -0.001        -0.007     
   (0.003)        (0.939)        (0.116)     
Prov_funds_sh     0.893***        0.358        -0.133   
     (0.000)        (0.129)        (0.390)   
Prov_style_sh       0.740***        0.338        -0.188 
       (0.000)        (0.183)        (0.115) 
Constant -0.345***  -0.295***  -0.248***  -0.183**  -0.058  -0.030  -0.052  -0.047  0.097*  0.104*  0.085  0.085 
 (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.007)  (0.049)  (0.606)  (0.766)  (0.595)  (0.618)  (0.099)  (0.061)  (0.108)  (0.106) 
R2adj 0.456  0.456  0.457  0.457  0.119  0.118  0.120  0.120  0.127  0.128  0.128  0.129 
N 64,819  64,819  64,819  64,819  41,002  41,002  41,002  41,002  54,883  54,883  54,883  54,883 
Notes: AlphaMOM was estimated from three–year moving windows for the Fama–French Three Factor Model with Momentum. DGPP is equal to one for GPP funds and zero otherwise. All regressions have yearly fixed 













Table A3.4. Table equivalent to Table 4 when AlphaCAPM is the dependent variable and ln(Size) controls for the funds’ size. 
 UK equity  Global equity  Mixed High equity 
DGPP 0.128***  0.129***  0.125***  0.122**  0.051*  0.050*  0.045*  0.044*  0.129***  0.120***  0.129***  0.125*** 
 (0.008)  (0.007)  (0.009)  (0.011)  (0.055)  (0.057)  (0.083)  (0.090)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
ln(Age) -0.021  -0.021  -0.022  -0.022  -0.004  -0.004  -0.003  -0.003  -0.009  -0.011  -0.010  -0.011 
 (0.124)  (0.125)  (0.122)  (0.118)  (0.750)  (0.749)  (0.814)  (0.825)  (0.181)  (0.126)  (0.163)  (0.119) 
Outsourced 0.024  0.024  0.026  0.027  0.038*  0.040*  0.040*  0.035*  0.039***  0.041***  0.039***  0.039*** 
 (0.299)  (0.306)  (0.241)  (0.227)  (0.067)  (0.056)  (0.061)  (0.100)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
ln(Size) -0.007*  -0.007*  -0.007*  -0.006*  0.009***  0.010***  0.010***  0.009***  0.006***  0.006***  0.006***  0.006*** 
 (0.054)  (0.054)  (0.052)  (0.060)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
Prov_spec 0.388***  0.351***  0.372***  0.306*  0.185*  0.123  0.183*  0.196*  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 (0.003)  (0.009)  (0.005)  (0.098)  (0.075)  (0.214)  (0.093)  (0.051)  (0.807)  (0.692)  (0.805)  (0.658) 
ln(Prov_funds) 0.008        0.012        -0.004       
 (0.331)        (0.172)        (0.412)       
ln(Prov_style)   0.009        0.010        -0.009**     
   (0.301)        (0.290)        (0.050)     
Prov_funds_sh     0.310        0.352        -0.165   
     (0.239)        (0.164)        (0.253)   
Prov_style_sh       0.186  -0.694***  -0.658***  -0.652***  -0.647***        -0.236** 
       (0.437)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)        (0.036) 
Constant 0.359***  0.376***  0.392***  0.406***        0.493*  0.260***  0.266***  0.244***  0.243*** 
 (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)        (0.080)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
R2adj 0.727  0.727  0.727  0.727  0.385  0.384  0.385  0.385  0.205  0.207  0.205  0.207 
N 36,745  36,745  36,745  36,745  37,314  37,314  37,314  37,104  51,281  51,281  51,281  51,281 
Notes: AlphaCAPM was estimated from three–year moving windows for the CAPM, DGPP is equal to one for GPP funds and zero otherwise. All regressions have yearly fixed effects and are clustered by fund. N is the 













Table A3.5. Table equivalent to Table 4 when AlphaCAPM is the dependent variable and ln(Size_avr) controls for the funds’ size. 
 UK equity  Global equity  Mixed High equity 
DGPP 0.112***  0.112***  0.107***  0.105***  0.038*  0.038*  0.034*  0.032  0.121***  0.116***  0.121***  0.119*** 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.005)  (0.006)  (0.053)  (0.054)  (0.086)  (0.109)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
ln(Age) -0.025*  -0.025*  -0.026*  -0.027**  -0.016  -0.016  -0.015  -0.015  -0.008  -0.009  -0.009  -0.009 
 (0.054)  (0.051)  (0.051)  (0.040)  (0.249)  (0.244)  (0.276)  (0.277)  (0.262)  (0.220)  (0.243)  (0.222) 
Outsourced 0.016  0.015  0.020  0.019  0.018  0.020  0.018  0.013  0.024**  0.025**  0.024**  0.024** 
 (0.431)  (0.452)  (0.319)  (0.346)  (0.330)  (0.302)  (0.343)  (0.509)  (0.045)  (0.033)  (0.042)  (0.043) 
ln(Size_avr) -0.016***  -0.016***  -0.016***  -0.017***  0.004  0.004  0.004  0.003  0.005**  0.005**  0.005**  0.005*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.200)  (0.196)  (0.215)  (0.297)  (0.015)  (0.010)  (0.012)  (0.009) 
Prov_spec 0.318***  0.224**  0.297***  0.043  0.109  0.065  0.128  0.117  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 (0.002)  (0.031)  (0.003)  (0.735)  (0.207)  (0.448)  (0.186)  (0.186)  (0.729)  (0.656)  (0.725)  (0.636) 
ln(Prov_funds) 0.023***        0.009        -0.003       
 (0.001)        (0.264)        (0.580)       
ln(Prov_style)   0.025***        0.008        -0.006     
   (0.001)        (0.372)        (0.210)     
Prov_funds_sh     0.875***        0.329        -0.126   
     (0.000)        (0.186)        (0.420)   
Prov_style_sh       0.685***  -0.080  -0.053  -0.050  -0.042        -0.143 
       (0.000)  (0.479)  (0.610)  (0.617)  (0.660)        (0.237) 
Constant -0.410***  -0.361***  -0.309***  -0.247***        0.471*  0.010  0.015  -0.001  -0.001 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.005)        (0.074)  (0.872)  (0.794)  (0.988)  (0.988) 
R2adj 0.462  0.462  0.463  0.463  0.074  0.074  0.075  0.075  0.063  0.064  0.063  0.064 
N 64,819  64,819  64,819  64,819  41,003  41,003  41,003  40,775  54,933  54,933  54,933  54,933 
Notes: AlphaCAPM was estimated from three–year moving windows for the CAPM, DGPP is equal to one for GPP funds and zero otherwise. All regressions have yearly fixed effects and are clustered by fund. N is the 













Table A3.6. Table equivalent to Table 4 when AlphaFF5F is the dependent variable and ln(Size) controls for the funds’ size. 
 UK equity  Global equity  Mixed High equity 
DGPP 0.116**  0.116**  0.116**  0.112**  0.085***  0.084***  0.077***  0.078***  0.109***  0.099***  0.107***  0.101*** 
 (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.026)  (0.030)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
ln(Age) -0.009  -0.009  -0.009  -0.010  0.007  0.007  0.008  0.009  -0.009  -0.010  -0.009  -0.011 
 (0.528)  (0.527)  (0.524)  (0.511)  (0.648)  (0.639)  (0.571)  (0.547)  (0.238)  (0.167)  (0.217)  (0.151) 
Outsourced 0.029  0.029  0.030  0.031  0.049**  0.057***  0.046**  0.045**  0.031**  0.034***  0.032***  0.033*** 
 (0.254)  (0.257)  (0.221)  (0.206)  (0.015)  (0.009)  (0.026)  (0.032)  (0.014)  (0.006)  (0.010)  (0.007) 
ln(Size) -0.006*  -0.006*  -0.007*  -0.006*  0.007**  0.007**  0.007**  0.006*  0.002  0.002  0.002  0.002 
 (0.085)  (0.086)  (0.078)  (0.090)  (0.025)  (0.019)  (0.032)  (0.051)  (0.431)  (0.296)  (0.374)  (0.246) 
Prov_spec 0.335**  0.308**  0.320**  0.259  0.135  0.056  0.176  0.179  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 (0.023)  (0.042)  (0.032)  (0.209)  (0.243)  (0.630)  (0.183)  (0.142)  (0.843)  (0.753)  (0.843)  (0.708) 
ln(Prov_funds) 0.006        0.013        -0.000       
 (0.510)        (0.153)        (0.981)       
ln(Prov_style)   0.007        0.006        -0.007     
   (0.500)        (0.624)        (0.172)     
Prov_funds_sh     0.314        0.571**        -0.068   
     (0.255)        (0.018)        (0.650)   
Prov_style_sh       0.176        0.562**        -0.196* 
       (0.491)        (0.035)        (0.094) 
Constant 0.235**  0.249**  0.263**  0.276**  -0.723***  -0.671***  -0.687***  -0.676***  0.090  0.104*  0.089  0.088 
 (0.038)  (0.025)  (0.019)  (0.021)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.148)  (0.075)  (0.116)  (0.118) 
R2adj 0.707  0.707  0.707  0.707  0.380  0.379  0.381  0.381  0.233  0.234  0.233  0.234 
N 36,745  36,745  36,745  36,745  37,314  37,314  37,314  37,104  51,281  51,281  51,281  51,281 
Notes: AlphaFF5F was estimated from three–year moving windows for the Fama–French Five Factor Model, DGPP is equal to one for GPP funds and zero otherwise. All regressions have yearly fixed effects and are 













Table A3.7. Table equivalent to Table 4 when  AlphaFF5F is the dependent variable and ln(Size_avr) controls for the funds’ size. 
 UK equity  Global equity  Mixed High equity 
DGPP 0.100***  0.099***  0.096**  0.094**  0.063***  0.063***  0.056***  0.056***  0.100***  0.094***  0.100***  0.095*** 
 (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.011)  (0.013)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.004)  (0.003)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
ln(Age) -0.015  -0.016  -0.016  -0.017  -0.002  -0.002  -0.000  0.000  -0.004  -0.006  -0.005  -0.006 
 (0.254)  (0.246)  (0.246)  (0.210)  (0.913)  (0.911)  (0.984)  (0.998)  (0.578)  (0.486)  (0.556)  (0.474) 
Outsourced 0.020  0.019  0.024  0.022  0.023  0.029  0.016  0.015  0.016  0.018  0.016  0.016 
 (0.345)  (0.361)  (0.259)  (0.284)  (0.216)  (0.139)  (0.413)  (0.440)  (0.214)  (0.154)  (0.205)  (0.189) 
ln(Size_avr) -0.016***  -0.016***  -0.016***  -0.016***  0.003  0.003  0.002  0.002  0.000  0.001  0.000  0.001 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.335)  (0.276)  (0.463)  (0.548)  (0.903)  (0.765)  (0.858)  (0.717) 
Prov_spec 0.288***  0.199*  0.268**  0.022  0.009  -0.029  0.087  0.059  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
 (0.009)  (0.068)  (0.012)  (0.870)  (0.926)  (0.779)  (0.483)  (0.616)  (0.786)  (0.703)  (0.783)  (0.664) 
ln(Prov_funds) 0.022***        0.006        -0.001       
 (0.004)        (0.484)        (0.777)       
ln(Prov_style)   0.023***        -0.001        -0.006     
   (0.003)        (0.954)        (0.211)     
Prov_funds_sh     0.837***        0.510**        -0.077   
     (0.000)        (0.031)        (0.633)   
Prov_style_sh       0.669***        0.448*        -0.171 
       (0.000)        (0.083)        (0.171) 
Constant -0.475***  -0.429***  -0.382***  -0.321***  -0.064  -0.030  -0.059  -0.046  0.171***  0.182***  0.165***  0.166*** 
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.575)  (0.774)  (0.547)  (0.630)  (0.005)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.002) 
R2adj 0.479  0.479  0.480  0.480  0.134  0.134  0.136  0.136  0.210  0.210  0.210  0.210 
N 64,819  64,819  64,819  64,819  41,002  41,002  41,002  40,774  54,933  54,933  54,933  54,933 
Notes: AlphaFF5F was estimated from three–year moving windows for the Fama–French Five Factor Model, DGPP is equal to one for GPP funds and zero otherwise. All regressions have yearly fixed effects and are 
clustered by fund. N is the number of monthly observations. P-values are shows in parenthesis. *** - 1% significance, ** – 5% significance and * – 10% significance. 
 
